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BINARIES: REMARKS ON CHAIM N. SAIMAN’S “HALAKHAH”
RICHARD H. WEISBERG*
As a way of capturing a small part of Chaim N. Saiman’s immensely
enriching new book,1 I will talk about eight binary operations (to be
found in italics below) arising from his text.  By binary operations—“bina-
ries” for short—I mean barriers to understanding brought on by empha-
sizing a dichotomy between seemingly opposed nouns.  So, for example,
we say “oil and water” or, more topically perhaps, “flesh and spirit.”  The
“and” in binaries is meant to express diametrical opposition or at least real
tension between the two linked nouns; so “Those two are like oil and
water” or “Shylock and Portia map out flesh and spirit as The Merchant of
Venice proceeds.”  The first seven of my examples propound the elimination
of the binary as false and unhelpful, substituting for it new code words—
found in bold below—that fuse the two parts into one.  (Only the eighth
and last example—a bizarre fusion crafted into the adjective “Judaeo-
Christian”—deserves to be “re-binaried” i.e. split in two forever2 instead of
linked, as it often is in everyday parlance.)  In full disclosure and in fair-
ness to Professor Saiman, neither the last linkage nor the first three bina-
ries are explicitly proposed by him in the book, but they are relevant, I
think, to many of his claims.
1. “Law and Literature,” the conceptual gathering place of this panel
and the binary title of my fellow panelist Sandy Levinson’s still mandatory
edition3 on the similarities and differences within that contentious inter-
discipline.  What did it mean to bring together such dissimilar human en-
deavors?  In part, at least for some of us, it meant then and means now the
elimination of the binary altogether.  Going back to the Jewish Bible and
to Cicero, these human endeavors have been linked in their common pur-
suit of expressing and organizing the world through language.  The mod-
* Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva
University.  I would like to thank Professor David Bleich, Mr. Jonathan Weisberg,
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of this article.
1. CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW (2018).
2. Strongest on this is Nietzsche, who severed the perverse joinder of “Old”
and “New” testaments: “In the Jewish ‘Old Testament’, the book of divine justice,
there are men and things and speeches in such a grand style that Greek and Indic
literature have nothing to equal them. . . .  To have pasted this New Testament (a
rococo taste in every sense) together into one book with the Old Testament, and
to call this the ‘Bible,’ ‘The Book,’ is possibly the greatest recklessness and ‘sin
against the Holy Ghost’ that literary Europe has on its conscience.” NIETZSCHE,
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 59–60, aphorism 52 (Marianne Cowan Trans., 1966)
3. SANFORD LEVINSON, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE (1988).
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ern-day pioneer of Law and Literature,4 Benjamin N. Cardozo, put it this
way, establishing and eliminating our second binary,
2. “Form and substance.”
Form is not something added to substance as a mere protuberant
adornment.  The two are fused into a unity. . . .  The strength
that is born of form and the feebleness that is born of the lack of
form are in truth qualities of the substance.  They are the tokens
of the thing’s identity.  They make it what it is.5
Law and Literature, and the corollary Form and Substance, are not
binaries: let’s finally agree to bring both together with a name: Cicero, or
maybe Cardozo.  And then, too, we might code word it Admiral Nelson,
recalling what the narrator of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor says about the
fusion of—
3. “Writing and acting.”  Melville’s narrator states:
At Trafalgar Nelson on the brink of opening the fight sat down
and wrote his last brief will and testament . . .; if thus to have
adorned himself for the altar and the sacrifice were indeed vain-
glory, then affectation and fustian is each more heroic line in the
great epics and dramas, since in such lines the poet but embodies
in verse those exaltations of sentiment that a nature like Nelson,
the opportunity being given, vitalizes into acts.6
Writing and acting are not binaries.  They form a unity, and let’s call it
Nelson or at the origins, Homer.
Melville’s martial example, like my opening metaphor, gets me closer
to Professor Saiman, with whom I now proceed more faithfully, helped
among others by Robert Cover and Rabbi J. David Bleich (my colleague),
as my paper circles nearer to his explicit arguments and to some of his
conclusions. Remember, though, that we have four false and one true bi-
nary to go!
4. “Halakhah as Nit-Picking Law and as Transcendent Ethics.”  Early in the
book, Professor Saiman speaks of halakhah along a spectrum of what he
calls “opposing poles”: “[as] a system of rules designed to govern human
behavior . . . [or] as an object of Torah study, and even as literature.”7
Here he comes dangerously close to adopting a binary that can do more
harm than good.  His book from start to finish tries to grapple with a com-
mon perception—which hardly means it is a true one—that Judaism gen-
erally (and the Talmud in particular) is a legalistic enterprise
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, in CARDOZO: SELECTED WRITINGS
(1947).
5. Id. at 340.  See further, on eliminating this binary, Richard Weisberg, Car-
dozo’s “Law and Literature”: A Guide to His Judicial Writing Style, 34 TOURO L. REV.
349 (2018).
6. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR 58 (Hayford & Sealts eds., 1960).
7. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
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“superceded” by some spiritually more uplifting belief system, such as
Christianity.  Fortunately, as Saiman’s text unrolls, a softening of the bi-
nary “legalism and transcendence” occurs frequently.  My favorite section,
to which I will return, is the part of chapter 4 called “Measuring Man,” in
which Saiman fully grasps that halakhah’s governing “pole” of legalistic
detail is usually in the service of and indeed intentionally inter-twined with
an overriding and occasionally majestic teaching about human nature and
experience.  But there are also binary sub-divisions, once we allow the un-
helpful thought that halakhah is best understood as either rules of law
meant for governing or as a complex narrative designed to be studied and
interpreted by unifying even the narrowest rules with the highest aspira-
tions of the Jewish people.  In my view, there is NEVER A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN THESE TWO FEATURES OF HALAKHAH.8  Let us code this
unity J. David Bleich in honor of my esteemed colleague at Cardozo, who
in a wonderful paper on halakhah says:
Judaism is fundamentally a religion of law, a law which governs
every facet of the human condition. . . .  [Rambam Maimonides,
to whom I will return below when we get to the laws of war,]
records the doctrine that the Torah will not be altered, either in
its entirety or in part, as one of the Thirteen Principles of Faith.
The divine nature of Torah renders it immutable and hence not
subject to amendment or modification. . . .  But Halakhah must
be applied in an infinite variety of circumstances that could not
have been fathomed by Jews standing at the foot of Mount Si-
nai. . . .  Torah is divine but “lo ba-shamayim hi—it is not in the
heavens” (Deuteronomy, 30:12); it is to be interpreted and ap-
plied by man.  [Bleich then reminds us that there is no binary in
Judaism between the Written Law and the Oral Law:] Judaism is
a religion of law.  Judaism without Oral Law is not Judaism.  Am-
biguity and controversy were bound to occur, and, quite appro-
priately, the Oral Law contains canons for resolving such matters.
The result is an exhaustive tradition of substantive, interpretive
and decision-making rules, a tradition endowed with sanctity be-
cause it is divinely ordained.9
When Rabbi Bleich uses the adjective “exhaustive” he reminds us that
halakhah’s detailed reasoning has worked across the centuries both to ad-
dress new situations and to maintain and develop the divine ordinations
about human nature and human behavior that are always entailed even in
the seemingly most picayune Talmudic disputes.  In his influential book
8. Professor Saiman concludes the first chapter not by abjuring the binary but
modifying it somewhat: “It is the fluidity between halakhah-as-law and halakhah-as-
Torah that enables it to assume its diverse roles.” See SAIMAN, supra note 1, at Chp.
1.
9. J. David Bleich, The Principles and Nature of Jewish Law, 40 CARD. L. REV.
3075, 3078 (2019).
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The Philosophical Quest,10 Rabbi Bleich asks and answers the question “Is
there a standard of conduct to which persons may be held, and according
to which human actions may be judged, other than the standard reflected
in normative law?”
Despite the nomenclature employed in describing this norm, viz.,
“lifnim mi-shurat ha-din—beyond the boundary of the law,” adherence to
the standard denoted thereby is prescribed as normative and binding and
hence endowed with the essential attributes of halakhah.
I read my colleague, who in private conversation recently continues to
decline for halakhah a “law-spirit” dichotomy, to be saying that any law
“beyond” the laws themselves is always already within those laws.  This is
for the outsider to halakhah (or as we shall see towards the end, the most
influential critics of it, call them as Professor Saiman reminds us, Jesus and
Paul) one of the hardest binary-destroying sensitivities to grasp.  How
much easier has it been through the last two millennia to dichotomize law
and spirit (nomos and narrative?11) turning “legalism” into a curse and
ironically unleashing millennia of non-Jewish secular law that is harsher
and often less “spiritual” than anything in the Jewish tradition could ever
have imagined?
Although Rabbi Bleich’s book is cited early by Professor Saiman,12
and although he retreats somewhat on his affirmation of this binary, he
sometimes seems to replace Bleich’s “law-as-exhaustive” with his own “law-
as-exhausting.”  He calls halakhah’s endless elaboration of rule upon rule
“legalized specification”13:
There are times when it seems that the Talmud knows nothing
but law. [Speaking of Talmudic treatment of the story of David
and Saul:] The Talmud, however, re-reads it through a thor-
oughly halakhic lens.  Ignored are the drama, the emotion, the
egoism, and all the juicy details of human life that course
through the biblical saga.14
In this formulation, soon elaborated by reference to Jesus and his dis-
ciples and their famous antinomianism—to which I return in my final bi-
nary—Professor Saiman seems again to revert to a notion of law that
avoids everything except minutiae.  I doubt he intended that, because the
richness of many of his subsequent analyses shows the erasure of the law-
ethics beyond the law binary that this and other passages disturbingly evoke.
5. Let us go on to use the code word Robert Cover in the dissolution
of the related binaries Halakhah as Nomos and Narrative.  Towards the end
10. J. DAVID BLEICH, THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST: OF PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS, LAW
AND HALAKHAH (2013).
11. See infra “Binary 5.”
12. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at chp. 1.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 22.
2019] BINARIES 791
of the book, Professor Saiman perhaps tardily but very respectfully points
to this legal scholar, whose untimely passing has left behind and bereft not
only the Law and Literature movement to which he contributed brilliantly
but also the world of twentieth and twenty-first century legal scholarship
generally.  Saiman points out: “Finally . . . that law consists not only of a
regulatory (imperial) dimension but simultaneously relies on ‘world-creat-
ing’ and thought shaping (paideic) functions that make the state’s regula-
tory apparatus possible.”15  Now he may well have been relying on Cover’s
ideas “throughout”—and he is obviously right that Cover “famously drew
inspiration from Rabbinic sources,”16  but the scholar’s seminal essay “No-
mos and Narrative”17 might have been brought in earlier.  For Cover,
halakhah embodied law’s fusion of nomos and narrative, the detailed elab-
oration of law by groups within the community who struggle every day to
express not only the is but the ought.  In the section called “Juris-
genesis”—the creation of legal meaning—“a bridge linking the concept of
a reality to an imagined alternative . . . the application of human will to an
extant state of affairs as well as towards our visions of alternative futures,”18
Cover cites the Talmudic tractate Aboth at considerable length, including
commentaries by Joseph Karo the great sixteenth century commentator
also cited by Rabbi Bleich19; Cover concludes:
Karo’s commentary and the aphorisms that are its subject suggest
two corresponding ideal-typical patterns of combining corpus,
discourse, and interpersonal commitment to form a nomos.  The
first such pattern, which according to Karo is world-creating, I
shall call “paideic” because the term suggests: 1) a common body
of precept and narrative, 2) a common and personal way of be-
ing educated into this corpus, and 3) a sense of direction or
growth that is constituted as the individual and his community
work out the implications of their law.  Law as Torah is peda-
gogic.  It requires both the discipline of study and the projection
onto the future that is interpretation.20
Robert Cover allows no law-“something higher” binary.  And Professor
Saiman, at his best as I at least read him when he discusses the Mishnah
regarding capital punishment in chapter 4 of his book, is sometimes of the
same mind.  Indeed, Cover in Nomos and Narrative also discusses capital
punishment in halakhic terms.  Defending capital punishment in some sit-
uations—a view that disturbed some of Cover’s smartest and sincerest aco-
15. Id. at 232.
16. Id.
17. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW
(Minow, Ryan, & Sarat eds. 1992).
18. See id. at 101.
19. See supra note 9, passim.
20. Cover, supra note 17, at 105.
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lytes21—Cover (citing Jewish law while possibly also thinking of the post-
World War II Nuremberg trials) associated in some cases the narrow (le-
galistic?/violent?) language of the extreme punishment with “an inspira-
tional narrative”: “Law’s expressive range is profound, and as with other
resources of language, the relation of law’s manifest content to its mean-
ing is often complicated.  Consider the question of using capital punish-
ment to express the dignity of human life and its ultimate worth.”22
Professor Saiman is to the same effect when describing a highly “legal-
istic” debate in the Talmud about what, if any, clothing should be left on a
man or a woman who has been condemned to stoning.  Any reader disin-
clined to see anything in “legalism” but desiccated non-spiritual nit-pick-
ing—we’ll return to Jesus and his followers shortly—would take the
language of Rabbi Yehuda (“[a] male is stoned naked, but a woman is not
stoned naked”) as missing the forest for the trees.  But Professor Saiman
reads further in the debate, where values of dignity are weighed against
the prolonged suffering occasioned by wearing any clothing at your own
stoning.  “Reading this Mishnah as Torah,” he says—but our argument
again would make this statement superfluous.  Since one must always fuse
Mishnah and Torah!—“what began as a technical debate over the proce-
dures of an imaginary system of capital punishment turns into a discussion
about the relative weights of physical and psychological pain.  This presen-
tation,” he concludes, “takes the focus away from speculating whether the
Sanhedrin [the highest court, when it existed] actually administered the
stoning punishment.  Rather, the Talmud is staking out an important
claim: technical halakhic rules reflect on core questions of human na-
ture.”23  So it is that many debates that seem highly detailed and even
absurd in a context where they stood no chance of being applied gain
nobility because they are “expressive rather than regulatory”24 and in their
expression, give voice to such quintessentially Jewish values as dignity, rev-
erence for all life, and mercy.
Seeing halakhah as Torah permits Saiman to work through a number
of “legalistic” debates and temporarily conclude that such “spiritual” val-
ues are always already embodied in those debates.  But this coloration has
been muddied a bit, at least in my view, by the earlier pages’ binary, which
tells us that our method should be to locate as on a spectrum the
(merely?) legal on one side and the sharply dichotomized “core/human/
spiritual/Torah” approach on the other.  But they are all, always,
interweaving.
Next, I bring up the very interesting discussion towards the end of the
book about Jewish rules of war.   This leads to the binary “pragmatic-idealis-
21. See, e.g., LAW’S VIOLENCE 214 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds.,
1995).
22. See supra note 17, at n.22.  Subsequent quotation from GREENBERG, SOME
POSTULATES OF BIBLICAL CRIMINAL LAW (1970) omitted here.
23. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 60.
24. Id. at 232.
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tic.”  The idea seems to be that Midrashic rules of law, developed while in
exile, were (like capital punishment rules when there was no Sanhedrin or
Jewish court to apply them) unrealistic once Israel became a state.  Here
the misleading binary can be re-stated as—
6. Practicality (“let’s get real”) and idealism (“let’s ‘naively’ adhere to the
norms of halakhah”).  This binary has no real place in halakhah, as with my
somewhat limited knowledge I have come to understand it.  The code
word for rejecting it—or for merging the two is Schlomo Goren, who is
featured by Professor Saiman towards the end of the book.  Rabbi
Schlomo Goren (1917–1994) ruled that a complete siege on Beirut in
1982 violated halakhah:  “[A]nyone—including enemy combatants—try-
ing to leave the city must be allowed to retreat unimpeded.”25
Goren, the chief Rabbi of Tzahal, was among the first to examine in
the newly founded state whether Hebrew sources serve as a basis for a
moral code in today’s modern Israeli army.  He answered affirmatively and
based his sharp limitation on army behavior upon a Midrash of Maimoni-
des himself, that “when a city is besieged to capture it, they do not sur-
round the city from all four sides [‘ruhot’] but rather from three sides,
leaving room for anyone who wants to flee to save his life.”  The Rambam,
as he is known, based his admonition in part on a verse from the biblical
book of Numbers 31:7 and on the view that before making war (a generally
disfavored activity under Jewish law), the Jewish authorities—however
others were conducting their wars!—needed to announce their intentions,
then offer peace, and only then wage the war if absolutely necessary while
always leaving a fourth “wall” open.
In the world we live in these days, it was inevitable that, as Professor
Saiman describes them, voices were raised as to the “serious pitfall in acti-
vating this halakhah.”26  Two types of opposition to Maimonides’ rule
were articulated as Israel went to war: some felt that a  modern state
needed to familiarize itself with the military laws of contemporary nations
and of international law but go no further toward Jewish tradition and law
that may in the situation have dictated more ethical actions; others
thought it bizarre to apply rabbinic standards from the centuries of exile
in which (as we have seen) Jewish law was being argued in a vacuum,
whether it came to capital punishment, or military sieges or almost any-
thing else relating to governmental behavior.  There had been no Jewish
government; now, for the first time in millennia, there was a modern state,
and it had to play by pragmatic rules, not by ancient legalisms, no matter
how revered in strictly Talmudic circles.  Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, described in
the book as generally committed to halakhah, “pointed to the tactical futil-
ity of allowing Palestinian Liberation Organization militants to escape Bei-
rut and re-group unharmed.”27  To these objections was added, according
25. Id. at 225.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id. at 226.
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to Professor Saiman, that of such secular non-Israeli authorities as Michael
Walzer who, in a famous essay War, Peace, and Jewish Tradition,28  says, inter
alia,
It is hard to see how a city could ever be taken [given Maimoni-
des’ fourth wall rule] . . . .  Nachmanides, writing a century after
Maimonides, strengthened the rule and added a reason: “We are
to learn to deal kindly with our enemy.”  It is enemy civilians who
are treated kindly here, for the ordinary or four-sided siege is a
war against civilians.  The radicalism of the Jewish law is that it
pretty much abolishes siege warfare.29
“But there is no acknowledgment of this,” Walzer continues, “and other
legal discussions assume the legitimacy of the siege and evince little con-
cern with its impact on the civilian population.”30
In introducing this discussion, Professor Saiman enlists Professor
Walzer, whose essay I do not read as unequivocally supporting it, into the
practical-idealistic binary.  “A three-sided siege is no siege at all,” he says,
and here Walzer seems to agree without necessarily opining as to whether
the halakhah lacks all “practical” significance in the modern world.  The
rabbis might argue that since most besieged cities are no longer sur-
rounded by four walls, the Midrash asks military leaders to leave a few
streets free so that people can flee the onslaught.  In so arguing, they have
both history and idealism on their side.  They might opine as follows, dis-
solving Saiman’s binary:
During the Nazi siege of Leningrad (1941–1943) a natural
“fourth wall” they didn’t plan for came into existence: the frozen
river on one side of the city permitted both the escape of people
and the bringing in of much needed food, water and other sup-
plies.  If God’s hand protected the victimized Russians from the
Germans’ very un-Talmudic cruelty, why should not His people
plan in advance for such lenity?  And then, too, permitting egress
of people and influx of supplies improves the chances—in condi-
tions of less than Nazi like oppression—that the beleaguered city
will wish to make peace, which is of course the highest aim of the
Halakhah.31
Saiman treats Rabbi Goren, who propounded the Rambam and the
Ramban’s view, although it dated to a time when Jews had no armies, with
respect.  But his conclusion seems to sustain a binary otherwise, in my
view, foreign to halakhah:  “This episode underscores the difficulty,” he
says, “of mixing spiritual ideals with the realities of governance. . . .  In his
28. Michael Walzer, War, Peace, and Jewish Tradition, in THE ETHICS OF WAR
AND PEACE (Terry Nardin ed., 1996).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. This “Midrash” is by the present writer.
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zeal to establish halakhah as the law of the state, he would commit the
Jewish army to fight under unnatural conditions.”32
Earlier, as I’ve noted, the analyst has accused the Talmud of “[ignor-
ing] the drama, the emotion, the egoism, and all the details of human life
that course through the biblical saga.”33  Is not Rabbi Goren’s appeal to
halakhic idealism precisely a recognition of the human condition in its
worst agony: the making of war, with all its intended or unintended
victimization?
7. My final binary—Law and Mercy—emerged during the Law and
Literature panel’s lively discussion of The Merchant of Venice.  I phrased the
issue that afternoon as follows: “WWJDAS: What would Jesus do about Shy-
lock?”  Now you won’t find Shylock’s name in Saiman’s index; but you will
find in the text a wishy-washy (to my eyes) defense of St. Paul’s treatment
of Jewish law.  It is legalistic, Saiman seems to be telling us, and the Jews
who sparked Christianity at the get-go legitimately sought something more
“spiritual”: “There are times,” he says with some repetitiveness, “when it
seems that the Talmud knows nothing but law.”34  Shylock as an easy tar-
get has epitomized for subsequent audiences that harshly legalistic view of
both law and ethics; so St. Paul would on this view have no trouble pillory-
ing him in much the same manner as do the play’s Venetian Christians
(an unworthy group, though!).35  Meanwhile, as my co-panelist and friend
Sandy Levinson interjected that afternoon, Portia—whose “hermeneutic
magic tricks” utterly defeat the Jew—seems to stand for “mercy.”  And
since Portia evokes the primacy of mercy,36 her victory over the legalistic
Jew appears to put the Bard’s imprimatur on the first Christians’ antino-
mian view.
But suppose Jesus himself returned to earth—prior to the second
coming, somewhat discretely, curious about what has become of the relig-
ion that bears his name!—“WWJDAS”? Jesus would surely become our
code word, he who dissolves the absurd binary.  He would know better
than anyone (except maybe for all Jews through the centuries and extraor-
dinarily maybe the Bard of Avon) that the Jewish people have always
linked law and mercy.  He would know better than anyone (except maybe
the Jews and the Bard) that Jews are instructed to do mercy and justice,
that Jewish courts actually applying the death penalty twice in seventy years
became known as “the bloody Sanhedrin,” that the Jewish deity demands
along with seeking justice that Jews, as reflections of their one God, con-
sistently do mercy.
32. SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 227–28.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id.; see also supra at “Binary 4.”
35. See e.g., Richard Weisberg, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE (1992).
36. In her speech to Shylock, who of course as a studious Jew knows more
about “mercy” from his own texts than she could ever imagine, Ivi (“The quality of
mercy is not strained . . . .”).
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What would Jesus do about Shylock?  He would not impose on the
beleaguered Jew the horrible cruelty inflicted on him by Portia (and
Antonio37) through legalistic tricks unknown to Jewish law; he would in-
stantly see the hypocrisy of his nominal followers’ smug assertion of their
own spiritual, supercessionalism of their own false claim of superiority
over the ethical, monogamous, Talmudic-yet-loving father, the Jew
Shylock.
And this leads to—
8. Our last coupling reveals, as I have pre-saged, the false linkage that,
unlike anything we’ve discussed so far, needs to be re-established and forever
retained as a binary; it is the one discussed (too early and too lengthily, in
my view) by Professor Saiman.  In a section called “Was Jesus Right?”38, he
describes the early Christian writings as accusing the Jews of being “law-
obsessed, Pharisaic, legalistic, etc—” and he could have added adjectives
like stiff-necked, false, hypocritical, stubborn—all attacks on Jewish law
that were accepted fatally and wrongly from then on, while at the same
time a Christian-ized secular law eventually became crueler than anything
they were attacking in its absence of mitigating oral and textual modifica-
tions that for Jews tended to eliminate the law-“something higher”
binary.39
Whether or not “Jesus was right” about Jewish legalism, his assess-
ment—at least as reported in the Gospels and other sacred originary
Christian texts—has in fact established the only “binary” that my account
here actually accepts.  Jews and Christians, as Paul implied, have separate
and often conflicting views about belief, life, interpretation, speech, and
especially law.  The compound adjective “Judaeo-Christian” is false, and
the hyphen must forever be chopped out of the atrocious binary.  So, as
Nietzsche40 first boldly observed: that which is hopelessly opposed must be
forever separated and never linked!
CONCLUSION
I have tried to unpack the rich opportunity for further discussion af-
forded by Chaim Saiman’s book.
37. See Richard Weisberg, Antonio’s Legalistic Cruelty, 25 C. LITERATURE 12
(1998).  See also the best essay ever written on The Merchant of Venice: Anton
Schuetz, Structural Terror: A Shakespearian Investigation, in LAW, TEXT, TERROR (Peter
Goodrich, et al eds., 2006).
38. See SAIMAN, supra note 1, at 24.
39. See RICHARD WEISBERG, IN PRAISE OF INTRANSIGENCE chp. 3 (2014); see also
“Binary 4” supra.
40. NIETZSCHE, supra note 2.
(i)
